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TRUST IN JAPANESE INTERFIRM RELATIONS:
 
INSTITUTIONAL SANCTIONS MATTER
 
ABSTRACT 
Trust is a critical component of interfirm relations, and scholars have pointed to Japan 
as an environment where trusting relationships flourish. In looking for environmental 
characteristics important for enabling and sustaining trust in Japan, we propose that a critical 
role is played by a combination of institutional and societal sanctions. Examination of Japanese 
subcontracting practices allows an elaboration of these sanctions and their interplay. We 
recommend further focus on sanctions in exploring interfirm trust issues. 
~James M. Hagen and Soonkyoo Choe 
-
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Considering that firms may obtain inputs through their own in-house production, by 
purchase on the open market, or through some intermediate mechanism such as an alliance with 
another firm, transaction cost economists (Williamson, 1975, 1985) characterize the open 
market as the default option as it garners the benefits of specialization. That option may not be 
effective, though, when markets are imperfect (due, for example, to a small number of buyers 
or sellers) and either party to the prospective trade demonstrates some likelihood of 
opportunistically cheating the other. Bromiley and Cummings (1995), Casson (1991), and 
Maitland, Bryson, & Van de Ven (1985), and are among those who have argued that trust and 
a spirit of cooperation can attenuate this opportunism and the limitations it imposes. 
While trust is important for the operation of markets, it is also very important for the 
operation of intermediate modes of transaction (such as alliances) as neither competitive forces 
nor hierarchical control dominate such relationships between firms. Fostering trust has become 
particularly important as intermediate governance modes have increasingly appeared as 
competitive alternatives to hierarchy. Examples of such intermediate modes include alliances 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1996), virtual corporations (Davidow & Malone, 1992), network forms of 
organizations (Powell, 1990), and participants in relational contracting (Macneil, 1985). 
Japan, as leader of the postwar move towards interfirm cooperation (Casson, 1991; 
Dunning, 1995), is often presented as a cultural model for fostering trust and cooperation 
(Casson, 1994; Ouchi 1981;). The belief that there is more trust in Japanese management than 
in Western management was formed during the 1980s as many Japanese firms emerged as 
champions in global competition and Western scholars sought out explanations for this success. 
Referring specifically to Japan as a model, Ouchi (1981) praised Japan for its between-firm 
relations, contrasting them to those in the U.S. where "firms rarely trust each other sufficiently 
to enter into the [bilateral] relationship" (p. 16). 
The benefits of trust are characterized in several ways. While Dore (1987) credits trust 
in part with a lower cost of doing business in Japan, Casson (1991, p. 12) credits it with 
Japan's ability to "respond effectively to changing world markets through the flexibility of their 
trained workers." McMillan (1984) attributed trust with being "a major lubricant to the total 
dynamics of man and machines, worker and manager" (p. 39). 
While trust may appear to be a universal characteristic of Japanese culture and a source 
of its success, we would expect that the degree of trust held by any given business firm would 
depend on the nature of its relationship with the party to be trusted and on the context of the 
transaction between the parties. This context factor helps explain the surprising survey findings 
by Yamagishi (1986, 1988) and Campbell (1995) that Japanese people actually trust less than 
Americans. In running dramatically counter to conventional wisdom, this encourages us to go ­
beyond observations that a person or country is trusting, and to rather investigate the context 
that may enhance or hamper the development of trust relationships. 
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Regarding trust as an attitude, it is certainly a slippery construct to attempt comparative 
measures of. Adding a cross-cultural dimension to attitude studies further increases the 
methodological complications (Triandis, 1994). For our purposes of trying to understand what 
motivates both trust and trustworthiness in interfirm relations, we suggest that the context or 
antecedents of trust in specific situations are more readily observed than trust itself, and that 
context may be an appropriate target of investigation. 
To learn from the apparently trust-enhanced Japanese business success, we first examine 
the antecedents of trust irrespective of specific nationality. Like others, we find that trust is an 
"elusive notion" (Gambetta, 1988; Powell, 1996, p. 62; Williamson, 1993, p. 453) which is 
difficult to operationalize. It is, however, closely related to and even enabled by the more 
clearly observable phenomenon of institutional sanctions. We then describe the role of 
sanctions that underlie trust and cooperation, particularly in the case of Japanese business 
practice. Following that, we discuss the role of sanctions in Japanese buyer-supplier relations, 
and we conclude the paper with several implications for future research. 
ANTECEDENTS OF TRUST 
Despite the importance ascribed to trust in today' s business environment, the ascribers 
(e.g.,Casson, 1991; Ouchi 1981;) frequently focus on calling for leaders to demonstrate trust so 
that followers can then reciprocate. Others ask more pointedly how to foster trust (Smith, 
Carroll, & Ashford, 1995. p. 20) or how to reinforce it (Powell, 1996, p. 63). 
In this section of the paper we address these "how" questions by discussing several 
antecedents of trust suggested in previous literature. We conclude that trust is highly context­
bound and that sanctions play an important role in those contexts. Sanctions of various types 
are present in all societies, and the nature of a society's specific sanctions influences the 
apparent trust observed in that society. 
Distilling from numerous definitions in the literature, we use the word trust as a 
reference to the expectation that the promise of another can be relied on, and that in unforeseen 
future circumstances the other will act in a spirit of cooperation with the truster. In transaction 
cost parlance, trusting a person, then, can be equated to believing that person will not act 
opportunistically. While some (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976) argue against applying 
personal phenomenon to firms, we subscribe to the view held by Rotter (1967) and others that 
trust and trustworthiness can apply to organizations. Specifically, we say that firms can act in a 
trusting or trustworthy fashion. 
In looking at possible causes or influences of the phenomenon oftrust, Rotter (1967) 
-

identifies individual disposition as an important cause. Even if trust is dispositional and firms 
can have such dispositions, however, a contextless explanation of trust is problematic in 
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explaining interfirm cooperation. A person may be highly trusting and trustworthy in some 
circumstances and not in others. Hofstede and Bond (1988) note, for example, that the 
Confucianist tradition of being trustworthy applies only to friends. Presumably a firm's 
trustworthiness would also depend on circumstances. 
Qf Zucker's (1986) three modes of trust production, the characteristic mode is perhaps 
closest to dispositional. Zucker defines it as based largely on family and ethnic background. 
To the extent that Japan has a culture of trust (Quchi, 1981), it would be an example of trust 
production by the characteristic mode. Zucker's other two modes are process (based on past 
experience) and institutional (related to established guidelines, whether they be legislated or 
unwritten but understood). The process mode is in effect when trust is based on reputation, as 
when a customer's trust of a used car salesman is based on satisfaction with past purchases 
from the same salesman or knowledge that others were satisfied. An example of the 
institutional mode might be our confidence that a state inspection and licensing system is 
preventing gas stations from mismetering their pumps. The gas station operators are sanctioned 
by the power of the state to suspend licenses. An example of a non-legislated institutional 
arrangement is the exchange-of-threat whereby prospective competitors in an industry each 
demonstrate their ability to retaliate against the others if their markets are invaded. 
It seems likely that sanctions also playa role in the characteristic mode. In the case of 
trust characterizing an entire community, we would expect to find that trust is seldom violated. 
Regardless of how the tradition of trust got started (whether by some sanction or by innate 
disposition) in such a community, it would seem that the very rarity of trust violations would 
make any violation that did occur to be such an extreme and conspicuous event that the violator 
would suffer shame, humiliation, or ostracism, and possible a more specific sanction as well. 
Violating the trust (or consequently, not trusting another) could effectively become 
unimaginable. 
Similarly, the process mode contains a sanctioning mechanism. A person with a good 
reputation has an asset that will suffer a diminution of value if he or she violates the trust 
represented by that reputation. The sanctioning effect is even stronger the more efficiently the 
reputation information can be communicated. Similarly, in the Shapiro, Sheppard and 
Chersakin (1992) categorization of trust (and as extended by Lewicki and Bunker, 1996), 
deterrence-based trust is most directly a result of sanctions, but the knowledge-based trust of 
knowing a partner's modus operandi still harkens back to some underlying behavioral 
motivation, such as sanctions, that exact a penalty for violations of prescribed behavior. 
Identification-based trust also relies on underlying motivations that are independent of the two 
partners identifying with one another. 
-

Granovetter's (1985) discussion of trust and malfeasance with respect to economic 
practice, which is related to the identification-based concept of trust, concludes that direct 
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experience with another person is a much more significant driver of behavior than that person's 
reputation is. The firm can be an effective governance structure for reducing opportunism, not 
so much because it enables decision making by fiat, but because it brings people into close 
proximity so that personal and trusting bonds can be formed. The link between proximity and 
bonds may be the opportunity each party has to observe the other and to detect any cheating by 
the other, which leads back to deterrence and sanctions. 
In addition to any heartfelt desire to be trusting and trustworthy, we propose another 
supporting motivation: a violation of trust within that context would be such an extreme act that 
it would result in sanctions such as social isolation and the need to seek new relationships. 
Cross-cutting ties between organizations so that a web of network relations is formed would 
tend to exacerbate those sanctions. 
While Granovetter plays down the value of formal contracts, Ring and Van de Ven 
(1992) see the development of cooperative interfirm relationships as a process involving the 
balance of formal and informal (psychological) components. These two components, however, 
seem inextricably linked. Formal institutions can foster a practice that becomes psychologically 
compelling (e.g., laws prohibiting nudity can, over time, result in people feeling uncomfortable 
even at legally designated nude beaches). We present a more pertinent example of this by 
Ramsayer in the next section. Our purpose in the present section was to argue that trust, in any 
of its dimensions, cannot be created in a vacuum and that the concept is only meaningful in an 
institutional or societal context. Part of that context is a formal or informal (but, in any case, 
very real) set of sanctions that enforces the trust. 
THE CONTEXT OF TRUST IN JAPAN 
In proposing that an attempt to understand a trust relationship is greatly aided by 
understanding the sanctions that form part of the context for that trust, we are extending 
Gerlach's view of institutional mechanisms providing the "backdrop" for a variety of "social 
ties" in Japan (1992: 52). We specifically argue that trust in Japan is enabled by institutional 
characteristics which, in part, operate through a sanctioning effect. 
Yamagishi (1986, 1988) conducted experiments in Japan and the U.S. which identified a 
relationship between trust, cooperation, and sanctions. One of his intriguing conclusions was 
that "Japanese subjects, who live in a society which is characterized by strong mutual 
monitoring and sanctioning, have weaker trust and cooperat~ less in the absence of a 
sanctioning system than do American subjects, who live in a more individualistic society" 
(1988, p. 217). 
-

The Yamagishi study is detailed in Appendix A, but for now note that his student 
subjects in Japan indicated by questionnaire that they trusted others less than the American 
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subjects did. Yamagishi then conducted an experiment with the same Japanese and American 
subjects in independent groups, whereby groups of them could mutually gain through 
cooperation. However, each player's gain was at risk of loss if the others did not cooperate. It 
was only in the experimental condition of non-cooperators being punished (the condition of 
sanctions) that Japanese subjects showed as much cooperation as the American subjects. 
Potential methodological problems that can bedevil such a study hamper our full 
embrace of Yamagishi 's argument that a constant background of monitoring and sanctioning in 
Japanese society makes Japanese subjects more reliant than American subjects are on sanctions 
in order to cooperate. We do, however, note his contribution of identifying a possible 
relationship between sanctions and cooperation/trust in Japan. 
The key question which this paper attempts to begin answering is what sanctions (if any) 
may be embedded in Japanese enterprise society that encourage cooperative behavior and how 
do these sanctions operate. Laws and regulations (backed by the force of the government) are a 
key sanction, as are customs, and the two can be mutually supportive, as evidenced by 
Ramsayer's (1985) exploration of the interplay between the cooperative tendency of Japanese 
people and their avoidance of litigation. He argues that it is primarily administrative barriers 
(including the regulatory restriction on the number of lawyers among others) that discourage 
litigation by making it non-economic for the litigants. The very rarity of litigation makes it 
customary (not just economic) to not litigate. Ramsayer goes on to caution, though, that the 
custom is probably not so strong that it would survive a relaxation of the regulatory barriers. 
In short, he advises looking at the institutional arrangements that help to perpetuate a culture. 
Another connection between law and cooperation in Japanese culture was offered by an early 
Japan scholar, Lafcadio Hearn (1904). 
Hearn is but one of many scholars noting that highly detailed penal codes of the early 
17th to mid 19th century included many penalties for putting self ahead of community interest. 
At the time of his writing, he noted that many of the laws had become customs and that the 
penalties for violations centered on ostracism. It is widely accepted that Japan is a collectivist 
culture in the sense that people's self-identification tends to be deeply rooted in group 
membership (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1994), and so ostracism would be a particularly severe 
penalty. 
At the two extremes, a group (or community) could comprise an entire country or just 
two people. There are rules that define behavior within sucJ.1 a group. Accordingly, as people 
belong to multiple groups, they become connected in a complex web of relationships. Each 
relationship within a Japanese group is hierarchical, with the ordering based on professional 
rank, year in school, or age, to name several examples. A two-person relationship in which ­
one person is the master or senior, and the other is the apprentice or junior is common and is 
called an oyabun-kobun relationship (Roniger, 1985). Both parties in the dyad have obligations 
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to the other. It is not surprising, then, that Hearn noted that the behavior of leaders (and not 
just followers), was also restricted by law and then custom. A modem day example ofthis type 
of restriction is the case of Prime Minister Sousuke Uno's forced resignation in 1989. When a 
geisha claimed that Uno had paid her during a five-month affair several years earlier, the public 
outcry was not Uno's immorality in having an affair, but rather his immorality in having 
treated the geisha badly enough that she would complain and go public with it (Hillebrand, 
1989). 
The education system also arguably impacts the power of sanctioning within Japan. The 
dense inter-personal networks formed through the university rating practices (Johnson, 1982) 
make it easy for information to be circulated among the people. Standardized pre-university 
education leads young students to develop similar perceptions on their roles in society 
(Lorriman & Kenjo, 1994). Part of that education is to follow strict behavioral norms. These 
institutional forces contribute to a phenomenon observed by Odagiri (1994) and others that 
people living in Japan give great weight to how they are perceived. 
In asking why relational contracting thrives in Japan, we see a system of sanctions 
supported, in part, by fear of ostracism. The importance of group membership, reduces 
mobility (as does a costly real estate transaction system) and makes the ostracism threat all the 
more effective. The next section describes this sanctioning effect in detail in the case of buyer­
supplier relation in Japanese enterprise. 
COOPERATION IN JAPANESE BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONS 
We have already asserted that sanctioning is an important part of the context for trust 
between economic actors. In this section we discuss how this assertion helps us to understand 
several important issues regarding Japanese buyer-supplier networks, specifically the 
relationship between Japanese subcontracting practices and trust, the social context for trust in 
Japanese buyer-suppler relations, and the transferability of Japanese buyer-supplier networks 
into foreign settings. 
Japanese Subcontracting Practices and Trust 
The competitive advantages, such as high productivity and manufacturing flexibility, 
which Japanese automobile and electronics firms are said to derive from harmonious supplier 
networks, have been well discussed (Abbegglen & Stalk, Jr., 1985; Clark, 1989; Fruin, 1992; 
Odagiri, 1992; Womack, Jones & Roos, 1990). A common explanation of the proliferation of 
buyer-supplier networks in these industries is that high trust and goodwill between Japanese 
companies in such networks enables them to cooperate with each other with little worry about ­
the other party's possible dishonesty (Dore, 1987; Oliver & Wilkinson, 1988; Ouchi, 1981; 
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Powell, 1990). As noted earlier, U.S. and British companies have been blamed for the low 
degree of trust in their interfirm relations (e.g., Casson, 1991; Dore, 1987; Ouchi, 1981). 
Nishiguchi (1993) finds that the trust which is present in Japanese buyer-supplier 
networks is not dispositional, having developed only since large manufacturing firms began 
investing seriously in their subcontractors in the late 1950s, motivated by the pending 
liberalization of foreign investment. The networks are specifically a result of innovations in 
contractual relations (Fruin, 1992; Nishiguchi, 1993; Odagiri, 1992; and Sako, 1992). Those 
innovations recognized as most important include a clustered control structure (by which 
assemblers buy from a limited number of subcontractors that in turn buy from their own 
subcontractors), systemized grading of subcontractor performance, short-term contracting, 
decentralization of quality control, bilateral price determination, bilateral product design, and a 
dual vendor policy (all of which are summarized in Appendix B). Individually and collectively 
these devices effectively reduce subcontractors' incentive to behave opportunistically for short­
term profits while also promoting competition among suppliers (Odagiri, 1994, p. 160). 
Each supplier is eager to increase its profits by advancing up the supplier hierarchy of 
the clustered control structure through continuous quality improvement and cost reduction 
efforts (Fruin, 1992, p. 276). The clustered control structure allows large assemblers to 
effectively manage their huge interrelated enterprises by "confining their attention to the 
management of the first tier of related firms" (Fruin, 1992, p. 273). 
The subcontractor grading system serves the large assembly firms as an effective tool 
for tracking down dishonest suppliers and rewarding competent suppliers: 
Grading and scoring methods and their contents differed from firm to firm, but the 
impact of grading on subcontractor prospects was consistent and clear. Those with 
better grade were given more responsibility and long-term commitments from the 
customers, whereas those with poor grades were still given a chance to improve 
[sometimes with the technical, financial, and managerial support from the customer]. If 
they did not improve after several periodic checks, however, they were either 
discharged or forced to become lower-tier contractors serving higher-tier subcontractors 
with better grades (Nishiguchi, 1993, pp. 333-334). 
Also, large manufacturers frequently request detailed cost data from subcontractors for 
bilateral price determination (Fruin, 1992, pp. 274-275; Nishiguchi, 1993, pp. 123-125; Sako 
1992, pp. 137-139), and they involve themselves in their subcontractors' production operations 
in order to facilitate bilateral product design (Nishiguchi, 1993, pp. 125-128; Sako 1992, pp. ­
149-151). The information to evaluate whether a subcontractor's price estimation is reasonable 
also comes from the tenders of rival suppliers maintained by the customer through a dual 
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vendor policy (Odagiri, 1994, p. 159). Opportunising subcontractors could be effectively 
punished by reducing the size of their contracts, demoting them to a lower tier of the supply 
chain, or in an extreme case, not renewing the short term contracts to which they are subject 
(Fruin, 1992; Roehl, 1989). 
Another characteristic of Japanese buyer-supplier relations is the "problem-solving 
approach" (Nishiguchi, 1993, pp. 171-190). The problem solving approach is the willingness 
of large manufacturers to help subcontractors solve various operational problems. It has 
encouraged subcontractors to respond in a trusting manner (Nishiguchi, 1993, p. 176). 
The institutional arrangements of subcontracting in Japan combine to provide large 
manufacturers with many instruments that could effectively (1) counter the incentives for 
subcontractors to behave opportunistically ex ante and (2) detect and retaliate against 
opportunistic subcontractors ex post. In addition, sound competition among subcontractors and 
effective sanctions against opportunistic subcontractors, within the institutional arrangements of 
subcontracting in Japan, allow the participating companies to improve their prospects for 
developing mutually trusting and harmonious buyer-supplier relations. 
Social Context for Trust in Japanese Buyer-Suppler Relations 
It appears that the current institutional arrangements for subcontracting in Japan are 
efficient in organizing interdependent productive activities of participating firms (Fruin, 1992; 
Nishiguchi, 1993; Odagiri, 1994; Sako, 1992), and it also appears that these arrangements 
provide a strong basis for mutual trust between the participating companies as we discussed 
earlier. An as yet unanswered question, however, is the extent to which these arrangements 
make subcontracting in Japan immune to any threat of potential opportunism. 
This question appears to be critical in explaining the proliferation of cooperative buyer­
supplier networks in Japan because any institutional alternatives are fundamentally imperfect 
due to the bounded rationality and self-interest orientation of economic actors. Discussing the 
fundamental imperfection of any human-designed organization, Granovetter (1985) maintains 
that efforts to devise institutional methods to prevent opportunism will be countered by the 
opportunists' efforts to circumvent those methods, and Yamagishi's (1986, 1988) experiments 
suggest that Japanese people may not be not an exception to this proposition. Therefore, it is 
essential to understand the social context in which potential cheaters would be prevented from 
undermining the established institutional arrangements, and in which the sanctions intrinsically 
built in the institutional mode itself could be more effectively imposed on those potential 
cheaters. The nature of sanctioning embedded in Japanese manufacturer-subcontractor relations 
becomes particularly critical. ... 
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Two examples show that the efficient institutional mode of subcontracting in Japan may 
have some weaknesses. First, the protection provided by the institutional safeguards built in 
Japanese buyer-supplier contracts are not equal for large and small participants. Most 
safeguards set in the contracts - such as subcontractor grading, a two vendor policy, and 
continuous renewal of short-term subcontracts, are primarily for the benefit of large firms. 
Small firms have few safeguards for themselves except some safeguards provided by the 
subcontractors' dual buyer policy (Martin, Mitchell & Swaminathan, 1993, p. 37) and by the 
Japanese government regulation on unfair subcontracting practices (Nishiguchi, 1993, pp. 70­
76). 
Second, however effectively the safeguards set by the large firms work at protecting 
them from their subcontractors' opportunism, the institutional apparatus could not perfectly 
close the possibility of the subcontractor fleeing to another supplier network with its skills and 
know-how gained with the larger manufacturer's assistance and commitment to the subcontract 
relation. 
This asymmetric protection is in industries in which transaction specific assets and skills 
play an important role (Nishiguchi, 1993, pp. 143-170). Transaction cost theory argues that a 
bilateral relation which involves investment in specific assets cannot be maintained unless the 
parties in the relation are effectively protected from each other's opportunism by certain 
arrangements such as each party making specialized investments of value only to their joint 
business (Williamson, 1985). Subcontracting in Japan goes beyond such mechanisms and is 
also "relational" (Dore, 1987; Macneil, 1985), drawing on face-to-face relations to help enforce 
minimally specified contracts (Fruin, 1992, pp. 272-277), which by nature leave more room for 
opportunism. 
A large manufacturing company's heavy reliance on subcontractors for product 
development and production inevitably involves the transfer of the company's economically 
valuable know-how and skills to the subcontractors [Roehl, 1989]. If a supplier who, having 
built production capability with the technical assistance of a large manufacturer, decides to 
serve other competing large manufacturers in the industry, the original manufacturer would 
suffer from the leakage of its manufacturing know-how. This is a reason why many high 
technology firms are so reluctant to enter into technology sharing agreements with independent 
firms (Ohmae, 1989). 
A large number of studies on Japanese buyer-supplier networks, however, have found 
that instances of parties opportunistically taking advantage of such potential institutional 
shortcomings are rarely observed (e.g., Abegglen & Stalk Jr., 1985; Aoki, 1994; Dore, 1987; 
-Fruin, 1992; Odagiri, 1992; Whitehill, 1991). We think this observation may be due, in part, 
to the sanctioning which is embedded in the Japanese buyer-supplier networks and which works 
as another layer of safeguards against players who could opportunistically find ways around the 
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institutional rules without suffering retaliation by trading parties. Such sanctions are facilitated 
by the mutual monitoring between the participants and the rapid dissemination of information 
about the credibility of the participating companies in buyer-supplier networks. 
As noted above, large manufacturers in Japanese buyer-suppler networks have many 
institutional instruments for discovering a subcontractor's dishonesty (e.g., subcontractor 
grading and access to a subcontractor's detailed cost data) and for punishing a dishonest 
subcontractor (e.g., continuous renewed short-term subcontracts and dual vendor policies). It 
is not surprising that there is information sharing within an industrial group (Kester, 1990. p. 
68). If the sanctioning in a network operates independently from the sanctioning in other 
networks, however, the punishment could not be effective since a dishonest supplier could 
switch to another similar network. In Japan, though, the information about a dishonest 
subcontractor disseminates quickly to other large assemblers through society's "modem 
institutional fabric," (McMillan, 1984: p.40) which includes extended families, schooling, 
intricate horizontal and vertical corporate networks, and government-sponsored trade 
associations (Bolton 1993, pp. 40-42; Whitehill, 1991, p. 94; JETRO, 1982, p. 90). 
For the consequence of such diffusion of reputation, Odagiri (1994, pp. 159-160) refers 
to the Japanese automobile industry in observing that the oligopolistic nature of the industry 
means that a supplier's reputation for dishonesty spreads quickly among the small number of 
buyers, and any gains from dishonesty are quickly overwhelmed by the negative reputation 
making it extremely difficult to establishing long term relationships with the assemblers. 
Similarly, such sanctioning also works against the large players. Since subcontractors 
also maintain long-term relations with large assemblers, they have considerable information 
about large assemblers' policies and welfare. Any unfair action by large manufacturers toward 
them would thus be easily discovered. Information about the large firms I unfair treatment is 
also quickly disseminated through the same dense web of inter-firm and interpersonal relations. 
Also, the small number of large assemblers in the Japanese automobile and electronics 
industries makes it easy to disseminate such information among suppliers. The cost of a large 
manufacturing firm's negative reputation can be high because suppliers are reluctant to obligate 
themselves to long-term trade relations with such an opportunistic company by investing in 
transaction specific assets and skills to serve it. Aoki (1984) and Roehl (1989) emphasize that 
the high cost of adjusting to new conditions in some industries and the need for a smooth flow 
of information in forming and implementing certain production systems enforces the need for 
large manufacturers to maintain long-term relations with the~r suppliers. 
To conclude, it seems that such collective sanctioning in Japan works as a powerful 
social instrument for reducing incentives for cheating as well as for punishing discovered ­
cheaters through social and economic ostracism. Cooperative buyer-suppler relations in Japan 
can thus be maintained not only through the sanction-supported institutional arrangements of 
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subcontracting developed by Japanese companies, but also through social sanctions that 
effectively discourage potential cheaters from evading their contractual obligations. 
Transferability of Japanese Buyer-Supplier Networks into Foreign Settings 
We have argued that both the institutional arrangements of subcontracting and the social 
sanctions embedded in Japanese buyer-supplier networks have contributed to Japanese firms 
developing mutual trust and cooperative long-term buyer-supplier relations. This finding 
suggests that Japanese manufacturing companies may have some difficulty in developing similar 
supplier relations with foreign subcontractors in other countries. 
Japanese companies have been anxious to establish reliable groups of suppliers (Odagiri, 
1994, p. 321). Sako's (1992) close examination of the buyer-supplier relations between three 
U.K. and Japanese electronics companies (a Japanese company in Japan, a U.K. company in 
Britain, and a Japanese company in Britain) and their 36 suppliers shows that the Japanese 
electronics manufacturer in Britain has tried to develop cooperative subcontracting relations 
with the local suppliers by replicating the institutional arrangements discussed above and 
summarized in Appendix B. The Japanese manufacturer's effort helped promote "goodwill 
trust," or a willingness to do more than is formally expected (Sako, 1992, pp. 37-40) between 
the company and its U.K. suppliers. Even though Sako does not provide comparable 
performance data between the firms examined in his study, his discussion strongly indicates 
that the Japanese approach to subcontracting helped the Japanese electronics company and its 
U.K. suppliers achieve significant productivity performance (pp. 221-246). 
Likewise, several studies of Japanese transplants in the United States and Western 
Europe suggest that Japanese plants in these areas have achieved a higher level of productivity 
and quality than the average in the area, due in part to the technical and managerial assistance 
of the Japanese parent companies ( Martin Mitchell & Swaminathan, 1993; Nishiguchi 1994; 
Odagiri 1994; Takamiya, 1981). For example, Takamiya's (1981) detailed case study of two 
Japanese plants in Britain, matched with a US owned and a British plant, found that both the 
Japanese plants generally recorded much higher productivity, quality levels, and lower 
absenteeism than the American or British plants, while employee satisfaction, working 
conditions, and time-off for holidays did not significantly differ between the plants. Similarly 
Sako (1994) found that Japanese plants in both Britain and Germany have better productivity 
and quality performance compared to British and German owned plants, and Nishiguchi (1993) 
found that Japanese consumer electronics plants in Britain usually reduced the overall defect 
rate on incoming components within a few years after start-up. 
Taken together, these studies indicate that Japanese institutional methods of ­
subcontracting also work well in foreign countries. For this, Nishiguchi maintains that 
"[Japanese companies'] ability to link and use efficiently various interfirm resource can be 
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adopted to other industrial societies" (1993, p. 185). Interestingly, the same studies commonly 
reported that even though Japanese transplants abroad outperformed their local competitors, 
those transplants on average failed to achieve performance as high as at their headquarters 
plants in Japan (Nishiguchi, 1993; Sako, 1994), with Abo (1994, 1994, p.243) finding that, on 
average, transplant productivity was 85 % that of headquarter plant productivity. 
How can we explain this observed productivity gap between Japanese transplants and 
their sister plants in Japan? Related to this question, Sako said "the historical development of 
institutions cannot be ignored, as buyer-supplier relations have developed in the context of a 
number of supporting institutions, such as the legal framework, the financial structures, the 
employment system, and the form of entrepreneurship through hive-offs" (1992, pp. 242). The 
observed performance gap between Japanese transplants and their headquarters plants in Japan, 
then, may be due to the Japanese methods being transferred to a setting where the context of 
supporting institutions is different from that in Japan. 
We note, however, that (1) the Japanese transplants examined by those studies were 
located in the most industrialized areas where supporting institutions are highly efficient even 
though they are not exactly the same as in Japan, and that (2) most studies of Japanese buyer­
supplier relations have emphasized the mutual trust and cooperation between the Japanese 
participants as a major contributing factor to Japanese manufacturers' strengths whether they 
are institutionally created or given by Japanese culture in some dispositional sense. It seems, 
then, that the performance gap between the Japanese transplants and their headquarters plants 
calls for an explanation. There is some evidence that removal from the context of Japan's 
societal sanctioning system as discussed above is at least a partial explanation. 
While Japanese automakers have generally been successful at applying Japanese systems 
(e.g., team orientation) to the internal operations of their US facilities, their efforts to build up 
Japanese style just-in-time procurement systems in these plants have been futile because of the 
failure of local suppliers to deliver on time (Kumon, Kamiyama, ltagaki, Kawamura, 1994, p. 
148). Another procurement problem for the transplants is that the quality of purchased parts is 
of a level that requires the transplant to have two to four times as many quality control workers 
per vehicle, compared to the ratio at the firms' parent factories (Abo, 1994, p. 249). 
These observations suggest that the Japanese institutional arrangement of 
subcontracting, including such frequently used management methods as the just-in-time system, 
may not work in a foreign setting as efficiently as in Japan Vtagaki, 1994, p. 116). At least a 
partial explanation for this may be that the collective sanctioning that operates through the 
dissemination of information on noncooperation and through public ostracism in Japan could 
not be easily transferred to the foreign subcontracting relations. This would be the case ­
because such sanctions are largely embedded in the Japanese economy and are generally more 
characteristic of Japanese society. 
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Thus, the consistently higher quality with competitive low price achieved by the plants 
in Japan (Sako 1992, p. 245), compared to Japanese transplants abroad and to local 
manufacturers (Abo, 1994; Nishiguchi, 1993; Sako, 1994; Takamiya, 1981) may indicate the 
Japanese institutional mode of subcontracting introduced in a foreign setting may not be as 
effective as in Japan in promoting mutual trust and cooperation between the Japanese 
transplants and their foreign suppliers and in countering incentives for the foreign suppliers to 
act opportunistically to gain short-term profits. The sanctions imposed on the foreign suppliers 
by the institutional arrangement may be less effective in the absence of the social sanctioning 
which supports buyer-supplier relations within Japan. Also, the limited mobility (to change 
employment or other relationships) which enhances sanctioning in Japan is not so characteristic 
of areas such as the U.S. and Europe. 
CONCLUSION 
While opportunism can render a transaction in any of the governance modes inefficient, 
the danger seems especially high in that mid-range mode of relational contracting where neither 
competitive forces nor hierarchical control dominates the relationship. A growing consensus in 
the business literature has trust as a critical ingredient in making such relational contracts work. 
Trust not only forestalls opportunism in defined transactions but also serves to seal the 
commitment by both parties so that they may jointly grow to their mutual benefit. 
Japan is often given as the premier example of a country where relational contracts (and 
other forms of alliances) actually work. Advice, though, to develop the kind of culture of trust 
believed to characterize Japanese interpersonal and interfirm relations is difficult to heed 
without some consideration for where that apparent trust comes from and how it is sustained. 
Trust is highly context-dependent, and it is meaningless to say that a whole country is 
characterized (as if in all situations) by trust. An examination, though, of the forces that 
discourage cheating and enable trust in specific situations can fruitfully indicate ways to foster 
cooperation. We have identified some institutional arrangements that can serve to give people 
and firms in Japan some confidence that they will not be opportunistically cheated, and we have 
also suggested how several features of Japanese society have supported those arrangements. 
Inspired by Yamagishi's (1986, 1988) recognition of the importance of sanctioning in Japan, 
we have identified these mutually-supporting institutional and societal arrangements as 
sanctions. 
We have demonstrated the importance of sanctioning" in buyer-supplier networks. 
Contractual institutions such as subcontractor grading and dual vendor policy serve as 
sanctioning mechanisms that promote cooperation by giving the buyer assurance against the 
­
suppliers defection. Cooperation is further supported by societal sanctions whereby ostracism 
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which can result from inappropriate behavior is particularly severe on account of minimal 
mobility and the complex interlocking of relationships that play a role in any business activity. 
Our initial motivation was an attempt to answer the question of "how?" when advised to 
establish cooperative, trusting relationships in the manner of the Japanese. We have 
demonstrated the importance of the sanctioning system in which Japanese cooperation is 
embedded. Amidst the recent calls to increase interfirm cooperation, we find reason to focus 
on the underlying sanctions. We find that institutional/regulatory mechanisms for fostering 
cooperation and cultural approaches are mutually supportive, and both are related to behavioral 
sanctions. Future research on explaining interfirm cooperation should not disregard trust, but 
neither should it shy away from examining the underlying sanctions. 
As an attitude, trust is difficult to operationalize for research purposes, while the 
sanctions that support it may be more easily observed. Focused studies could look at the 
relationship between sanctions and trust/cooperation in a variety of cultural/industrial settings. 
Government policy makers are in the business of establishing institutions and manipulating 
sanctions, and an understanding of how those sanctions directly and indirectly impact trust in 
various business environments could make for better policy. One of the questions suggested by 
this paper is whether relational contracting is to be embraced as enthusiastically as business 
literature would suggest in countries lacking the necessary sanctioning systems. 
-
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APPENDIX A:
 
YAMAGISm EXPERIMENTS AS REPORTED IN HIS 1988 PAPER
 
Objectives 
In his experiments, Yamagishi investigated (1) the relationship between trust and cooperation; 
(2) the influence of sanctions on cooperative behaviors of high and low trusters; and (3) the 
influences of sanctions on cooperative behaviors of Japanese and American subjects. 
Design 
The subjects were 192 U.S. and 221 Japanese college students. Before the experiments, 
Yamagishi used a questionnaire to measured the level of trust each subject had. The 
experiment was run in four-person groups. The experiment consisted of 16 sessions. 
In each session, subjects were notified first that they had been given 50 cents and then were 
asked how much of 50 cents they wanted to contribute to other members of the group (in 
multiples of five cents). The amount contributed then was doubled in value and was distributed 
equally among the other three members. After deciding how much they wanted to contribute to 
the other members, subjects in the sanctioning condition were asked again to decide how much 
they wanted to contribute to a "punishment fund." They could contribute any amount, 
regardless of the amount contributed by other members. They paid this amount from their 
cumulative earnings. Twice the total amount contributed to the punishment fund was then 
subtracted from the cumulative earnings of the subject whose level of contribution to other 
members (not including the contribution to the punishment fund) was the lowest among the four 
members. 
After all four members had made decisions on cooperation in the absence of sanctioning and in 
the presence of sanctioning, the following feedback infonnation was displayed on the subject's 
screen: how much the subject had contributed to the other members (and to the punishment 
fund), the total amount contributed by the other three members and the amount of benefits the 
subject received from the other members' contributions, the total amount of the punishment 
fund, the number of lowest contributors and the amount of punishment administered to each of 
the lowest contributors, whether the subject was one of the lowest contributors, the subject's 
net earnings in that period, and the subject's cumulative earnings. 
Findings 
Major findings were (1) when no sanctioning system existed, high trusters cooperated more 
strongly than did low trusters; (2) when the sanctioning system existed, low trusters contributed 
more to the sanctioning system than did high trusters; (3) the sanctioning system had a stronger 
effect on the low trusters' cooperation than on the high trusters; and (4) American subjects ­
cooperated more strongly than Japanese subjects when no sanctioning existed. 
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APPENDIXB:
 
CONTEMPORARY SUBCONTRACTING PRACTICES IN JAPAN
 
Clustered Control Structure 
The finn at the top of a production pyramid (like Toyota and Mitsubishi) buys complete 
assemblies and systems components from a concentrated base (and therefore relatively limited 
number) of first-tier subcontractors, who buy specialized parts from a cluster of second-tier 
subcontractors, who buy from third-tier subcontractors and so on (Nishiguchi, 1993, pp. 119­
123). 
Subcontractor Grading 
The subcontractors I perfonnance is continuously evaluated by the customers in tenns of 
product quality, delivery, engineering, and others considerations. In general, subcontractors 
are told their grades and are periodically given detailed scores, with indications of weak areas 
to be improved (Nishiguchi, 1993, pp. 133-136; Fruin, 1992, pp. 274-277). 
Shon-term Contracts 
Large manufacturers usually do not have contracts of more than 12-16 months duration with 
their suppliers, even though the average trading relationship is more continuous and stable in 
Japan than in other countries. Therefore large manufacturers are legally quite free from the 
obligation to maintain a long-tenn trade relation with a subcontractor (Fruin, 1992, p. 272; 
Odagiri, 1992, p. 151; Roehl 1989). 
Decentralization of Quality Control 
Quality-control inspection of parts and components is the responsibility of the sub-assembler 
rather than the final assembler. Relying on this, large Japanese assembly finns (i.e., Toyota) 
employ the just-in-time (JIT) manufacturing system of low inventory. Quality is insured 
primarily by helping subcontractors improve their quality through technical and managerial 
assistance (i.e., TQC) and through overall subcontractor grading, rather than by the inspection 
of the incoming parts and components (Fruin, 1992, pp. 274-277; McMillan, 1984, pp. 162­
166; Sako, 1992, p. 101). 
Bilateral Price Determination 
Customers frequently request detailed cost data from subcontractors. Rather than negotiating 
price downstream, prime contractors and subcontractors alike look at the possibility of reducing 
costs at the source. In exchange for long-tenn relations, prime contractors are able to demand 
subcontractors' continuous contribution to price reduction arid product quality (Nishiguchi, 
1993, pp. 123-125; Fruin, 1992, pp. 274-275; Sako, 1992, pp. 137-139). 
..
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Bilateral Product Design 
Japanese automotive producers adopt the "target cost" method of new product development, 
which involves the component suppliers at an early stage. The method works on market price­
minus principle. The sales price of a new car model is determined first, and the final assembler 
and its suppliers jointly evaluate the various possibilities in product design to reduce the 
combined costs of the parts while keeping constant the required specifications. Along with this 
method, the assembler and its suppliers use "profit-sharing rules." If, for example, the price for 
a component was agreed on as 120 points for the car's first model-year, during which time 110 
points, the target price for the second year, was in fact achieved by their "joint" efforts, then 
the assembler would pat the supplier 115 points, thus sharing the profit evenly. If, however, the 
cost was further reduced during that period, say, 108 points, then the balance would go to the 
supplier (Nishiguchi, 1993, pp. 125-128; Sako, 1992, pp. 149-151). 
Black Box Design 
The customer provides basic ideas and specifications of size and performance for a particular 
component, and the supplier attends to the details of the design, fully utilizing its expertise in 
its specialized area. This arrangement relieves the customer of part of the increasingly complex 
and expensive management of product development, and it also gives the supplier incentives to 
propose new ideas, to make invest in its production, and to expand its business (Nishiguchi, 
1993, pp. 129-130; Sako, 1992, p. 151). 
Dual Vendor Policy 
Large assemblers maintain at least two (existing or potential) suppliers for each and every kind 
of component they need (Odagiri, 1994, p. 159; Fruin, 1992, p. 272). 
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